Sheikh Hasina’s downfall on 5 August 2024 was a chronicle foretold by all, except NewDelhi’s ‘state operators’ who continued with their domineering agenda. A hastily put togetherinterim government under Muhammad Yunus as ‘Chief Advisor’ worsened matters and a‘reign of terror’ followed in Bangladesh.
As many as 400 police stations were torched. AI-assisted search results indicate ‘over 600deaths from mob lynching, 250 from retributive violence and 40 extrajudicial killings sinceAugust 2024’. While there were a few Hindus among them, the overwhelming majority ofvictims were Muslims and Awami League supporters.
Patient diplomacy in this period could have paid India better dividends than outrage. India’sself-righteous wrath conveniently overlooked the fact that minority-bashing is an encouragednational pastime: in the last decade, more than 100 Muslims have been lynched in India (with 25 Muslims killed by mob violence in 2025 alone). The anti-Bangla fury that swept Indiawas led by a largely tutored media.
The ruling Hindu Right’s irresponsibility was evident on social media, where hate waswhipped up not only against Bangladesh and Bangladeshi Muslims, but also against Bangla-speaking citizens long domiciled in India. In Bangladesh, the death of popular student leaderSharif Osman Hadi on 18 December 2025 (six days after he was shot by two bike-borneassailants) reignited a fresh wave of anti-India sentiment.
The voters of Bangladesh have not yet shown their hand, and India has not yetofficially ‘lost’ its only friend in the neighbourhood.
It is a fact that the violence of 1947 triggered the exodus of Hindus from Bangladesh to India(Bangladeshi Hindus went down from 28 per cent to just 8 per cent of the population). It isalso a fact that many Hindus (and Bengali Muslims) migrated seeking better economicopportunities.
Many Bangladeshi Muslims harbour a legitimate historical grievance against the BengaliHindu bhadralok who, during two centuries of British rule, benefited disproportionately fromthe exploitative zamindari system and monopolised government jobs.
Many Indians grumble that Bangladeshis are not eternally grateful to India for theirindependence. It is worth remembering the sacrifices that Bangladeshis themselves made.There is no such thing as eternal gratitude in international relations. Vietnam, for instance, isnow downright hostile to China, the country that was its staunchest ally in resisting America’slong drawn war.
The dice rolls on as do successive generations. Rescuer–victim persecutor role-playing endsup perpetuating cycles of blame rather than resolving underlying problems. Toxic elementson both sides of the border need their regular ‘fix’ to remain high on hate—India must refrainfrom reacting to every provocation. Any further missteps may exact a deadly, long-term price.
India made its first big mistake in January 1972 by foisting (an absentee) Mujibur Rahman onDhaka, antagonising the likes of Zia-ur Rahman, who had actually fought Pakistan on theground. The Mukti Bahini was excluded from witnessing the Pakistan army’s surrender to theIndian army in Dhaka on 16 December 1971.
This slight continues to rankle. India indulged Mujib’s authoritarian, allegedly corrupt rule,even as floods and a manmade famine ravaged Bangladesh in 1974–75. While officialestimates place the death toll at around 27,000, independent studies suggest it may havebeen as high as 1.5 million. Indians ignorant of this reality are naturally shocked by thedesecration of Mujib’s statues and memorials by incensed Bangladeshis, who hate India forMujib’s failings.
Modi’s India also looked away when Sheikh Hasina repeated the pattern as prime ministerbetween 2009 and 2025. The last three elections were rigged, but observers sent by India’sElection Commission turned in glowing reports of free and fair polls each time.
What hurt Bangladeshis even more was Sheikh Hasina’s kowtowing to a person despised byMuslims and the free world. They were aghast when she bent backwards in 2015 to enableIndia’s chief crony capitalist Gautam Adani secure a $1.7 billion deal to export power fromhis Godda coal plant.
Patient diplomacy in this period could have paid India better dividends than outrage. India’s self-righteous wrath conveniently overlooked the fact that minority-bashing is an encouraged national pastime: in the last decade, more than 100 Muslims have been lynched in India (with 25 Muslims killed by mob violence in 2025 alone). The anti-Bangla fury that swept India was led by a largely tutored media.
Reports revealed that the Indian prime minister and his handpicked foreign ministerengineered a heavily skewed Power Purchase Agreement, forcing Bangladesh to pay Adani$4.55 billion annually, regardless of whether any electricity is supplied. As an MP, I raised theissue of Adani’s excessive profiteering with our foreign minister. He prevaricated, until publicagitations forced Adani to lower his prices.
Noted Bangladeshi economist Debapriya Bhattacharya estimates that Hasina’s regimesiphoned $16 billion out of the country—every year. The number of dissenters (andcriminals) who were tortured and liquidated by Hasina’s corrupt police is yet to be fullyaccounted for.
Modi’s India, however, ensured that Hasina continued in power. Rage against her excessesspilled over as vitriol against India for propping her up. The Islamic Right took full advantageof Hasina’s ouster. Many Bangladeshis saw Islam as a way to settle old scores with Indiaand mark their opposition to India’s Hindu Right and state sponsored Muslim-baiting.
The voters of Bangladesh have not yet shown their hand, and India has not yet ‘lost’ its onlyfriend in the neighbourhood. India must dial down its fixation on Sheikh Hasina. The AwamiLeague—currently banned in Bangladesh—still commands a large chunk of the secular vote,and a word from Hasina will matter a lot to them. She must rise above party politics anddemonstrate statesmanship.
At the moment, the only historically organised party with a nationwide network is theBangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Awami’s bête noire. Founded by Zia-ur Rahman, whobrought in key welfare measures, the BNP was led by his wife Begum Khaleda Zia after hisassassination in 1981. She served twice as prime minister. Her death on 31 December 2025has generated a massive sympathy wave for her son and heir, Tarique Rahman, whoreturned to Bangladesh after 17 years of exile in London, just six days before her passing.
Tarique has since taken over the reins of the BNP. The rise of the Jamaat-e-Islami—a diehard anti-India, anti-Hindu, pro-Pakistani rightist party that betrayed Bangladesh’s MuktiYuddha and committed atrocities against freedom-fighters and women—has been dramatic.It has helped the BNP in the past, but never held power.
Flush with international funding, the Jamaat has declared that its moment has come. TheNational Citizen Party (NCP), formed by former student activists with Yunus’ blessings, lacksgrassroots support. Its electoral alliance with Jamaat angered many young leaders,especially women, who resigned. The BNP or any other party’s anti-India stance is not themain concern—we’ve earned it.
What matters is the outcome of the February elections. The BNP, with its strong grassrootsnetwork and capable leaders, is likely to ride a sympathy vote. BNP has been no friend ofIndia either, but Tarique Rahman may be the only leader capable of salvaging Bangladesh’stroubled polity. While no party in Bangladesh can afford to be seen as pro-India, the twocountries cannot afford to remain adversaries.